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Brief of Respondent
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Since the statement of facts by defendant-appellant does
not give a complete picture of the case as presented to the
trial court. the plaintiff-respondent here files her statement
of additional facts.
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The defendant and all of the intervening defendants
by their pleadings defended this action upon the ground that
(Tr. 12,13,14).

the plaintiff was a trustee.

Such was the

contention at the pre-trial. (Tr. 33). Upon the trial that theory
was abandoned and the defendant-appellant alone defended
upon the ground that she retained an interest in the premises
( T r. 77,78).

as a surviving widow under our statutes.

It appeared from the evidence of both parties that the
defendant-appellant and her nominee received from the respondent upon three separate occasions conveyances to three
different portions of the original tract purchased by the plaintiffrespondent,

a

portion

of

which

tract

is

the

subject

of this action. (Tr. 83,86). The portions conveyed were designated by the appellant.

(Tr. 87}.

The appellant in her

statement of facts contends that such conveyances were without consideration, but respondent offered evidence that such
conveyances were executed and accepted in satisfaction of
appellant's purported claim to an undivided interest in the
whole of such real property.

(Tr. 86,7).

Appellant's deposition was received at the trial by stipulation.

( T r. 138) . It appears therefrom that the premises in

question were purchased by the decedent, Ephraim Jeppson.
in his lifetime, and that such purchase price was paid in part
by a mortgage executed by the decedent, his wife who is the
appellant, and others.

(Page 44 of Deposition}. This mort-

gage was refinanced by a mortgage to Home Owners' Loan
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Corporation executed

by

the appellant as administratrix ( Ap-

pellants Petition to lYiortgage in Probate File) which said
mortgage

was

assumed

and

paid

by

the

respondent.

(Tr. 32. 33).

II.

STATEMENT OF PARTICULAR QUESTIONS
ARGUED

(A) \VAS THE WIDO\V'S INTEREST DIVEST-

ED BY THE PROBATE SALE?
(B) IS THE WIDOW NOW BARRED ANDESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SUCH RIGHT IF SUCH
RIGHT WAS NOT DIVESTED?
ARGUMENT
(A) Respondent does not concede that as a general
proposition a widow's interest in real property should be regarded as continuing despite a valid. duly confirmed probate
sale of the premises in her deceased spouse's estate. But as
wilJ be hereinafter noted, there are circumstances herein which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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should be considered if such general proposition is assumed
as contended by appellant.

Appellant relies upon (a) the dicta
which involve questions of taxation and
state rules regarding common law dower.
cited
the appellant from this court

by

of this court in cases
(b) decisions which
In none of the cases
was the proposition

advanced by her before the court for decision, and it is submitted that the statute under consideration has never been
construed in so far as the questions here under consideration
are concerned.

As is pointed out by the annotations to ·our 1943 Utah
Code, Section 101-4-3, was originally taken in part from
McClain's Annotated, Statutes of Iowa, 1888, No. 3644, and
incorporated in the Utah Statutes in the year 1898.

In re

Reynold's Estate, 90 U. 415, 421, 62 P. 2nd 270.

The

corresponding section of the 1939 Code of Iowa is No. 11990.
Such later section of the Iowa code differs materially from our
section in that the Utah Code limits the types of debts of the
decedent to which the statutory interest is expressly subject,
but it is felt that a brief reference to the Iowa decisions will be
helpful since the language in our section is in part
the same.

Under the Iowa decisions, a widow who received proper
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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notice of a probate proceeding to sell the real pr~perty of her
deceased husband. must set up her rights, if any, in that
proceeding, and cannot thereafter claim any interest in the
property sold. 1 Annotation to Code of Iowa, 1939, 1784.
Sec. 118. Re:

Estate of Pennock. 122 Iowa 622. 98 N\V

Attention of the court is invited to the grammatical construction of the statute u~der consideration, and particularly
to the form and tense of the verbs used. 10 1-4-3, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, reads in part: "one-third in value * * *
shall be set apart as her property in fee simple, if she survives
him * * * ." (Italics added) . It is submitted that the form of
the verbs implies some affirmative act of the probate court
in awarding her "one-third in value," and that the tense of the
verbs seems to indicate an interval of time between the fact of
survivorship and the fact of such award of real property. If
this particular section is so construed according to its grammatical construction, appellant's only complaint would be that
the probate court failed to make a proper award to her, and it
is now far too late to complain of what the said probate court
did or did not do, even assuming that such complaint would
be well founded.

As to appellant's citations concerning the general rules
affecting dower rights, the following considerations are submitted for the consideration of the court:
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As was said in the case of Scott v. Wells, 56 N\V 828,
at page 829:

"In various opinions in this court the estate which
a widow takes in the lands of her deceased husband
has been to some extent likened to dower. It has been
said to be 'in the nature of dower,' 'an enlargement
of dower,' etc. Such expressions are apt to be misleading. They suggest a likeness between things essentially dissimilar. The only particular in which
common-law dower and the estate that now goes to the
widow resemble each other is that the same person
takes

* * * ."

However, it is felt that a closer examination of the rules
of common law dower should be made, as such rules might be
of some help in the disposition of this appeal.

Appellant quoted an excerpt from 24 Corpus Juris 684
to' the effect that dower generally is not divested by. an adminis-

j

tration sale. That rule is further explained in the corresponding
section appearing in 34 Corpus Juris Secundum 615, Section
637, which adds: "although the reversion of lands assigned or

set apart as dower may pass by such a sale." The quoted words
make it clear that the text refers to a situation where a widow
has been awarded a common law dower, not to a situation
where she might receive a statutory fee simple interest such as
is here under discussion.
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l\'loreover the same section. 34 Corpus Juris Secundum
616. Section 637, makes this further qualification:

"a sale

to satisfy a debt to which the dower estate is subject
discharges dmver

i

ll

* * * .''

The ""idow' s statutory interest is made expressly subject
by the terms of Utah Code Annotated. Section lOl-4-3, to
debts ''created- for the purchase thereof.'' As will appear from
the statement of facts, the purchase of the :gremises in the
probate court was made in part by the assumption of a Home
Owners' Loan Corporation mortgage which was a direct renewal of a purchase money mortgage.
Furthermore, this appellant, the surviving widow, joined
in the purchase money mortgage which was renewed as aforesaid. Apart from considerations as to the purpose of the
mortgage, the wife's interest was inferior to the lien of the renewal mortgage even though she did not join in the execution
of the latter. Tracy Loan and Trust Company v. Luke, et al.
72 Utah 231, 269 Pac. 780.

(B) IS THE WIDOW NOW BARRED ANDESTOPPED FROM

ASSERTING

SUCH RIGHTS ARE

SUCH

RIGHTS IF

ASSUIVIED NOT

TO HAVE

BEEN DIVESTED BY THE PROBATE SALE?
Upon such assumption, the parties to this action became,
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after the probate sale. tenants in common as to the whole of
the property sold. The appellant owned and held an undivided
one-third interest and the respondent owned and held an undivided two-thirds interest. Thereafter, the appellant received
deeds to separate portions of the. said land.
In 4 Thompson on Real Property 474, Section 1962,
there appears the general rule:

''It is well settled that co-owners of land may,
by a bona fide mutual agreement among themselves.
make a division thereof so as to sever their interests
\Vithout going through the ordeal of a trial by proof in
court as to title.''
The next section, 1963 further states the rule. and in part
reads:
''Where several members of a family effect a
partition by deeds among. themselves, it will not be
disturbed unless it appears that substantial inequalities
exist to the detriment of the interest of some.''
The appellant here does not contend that she-has received

J

an inequitable portion of the premises, but insists that the

,

former deeds were wholly without consideration, and that she
should now receive an undivided third of all of the premises
remaining.

It is submitted that the finding of the court that the
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appellant is ··no\Y barred and estopped from asserting any
interest of. in or to the premises retained by the respondent"
is supported by the evidence.
\ \'HEREFORE, the respondent prays that the judgement be affirmed with costs assessed against the appellant.
Respectfully submitted,

LAMOREAUX & TUFT
RUSSELL & LIVINGSTON
.Attorneys /or Plaintiff and Respondent.

Due service of two copies of foregoing Brief of Respondent acknowledged this ------------------------ day of January,
A. D. 1949.

Attorney for Appellant
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